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1 Introduction
Unlike Denmark and the United Kingdom, the new members that have recently joined
the European Union have no special status with respect to the European Monetary Union
(EMU). They have joined EMU with the status “countries with a derogation” and are sup-
posed to adopt the Euro as soon as economic convergence is achieved. While the Maas-
tricht criteria (inflation rate, long-term interest rate, exchange rate stability, budget deficit
and public debt) play a prominent role in the public discussion of the convergence status
and are regularly assessed in convergence reports by the European Central Bank, this paper
describes the consequences of acceding countries’ EMU entrance in terms of the respective
country’s output and inflation variability. A small two-country model, which can be de-
rived from the optimizing behavior of economic agents, is specified and combined with two
different monetary policy regimes: (i) national monetary policy, and (ii) monetary union.
The performance of monetary policy is analyzed in terms of inflation rate and output-gap
standard deviations, which are the usual components of central banks’ loss functions in the
literature on optimal monetary policy. A relative loss index is defined as the average of
the relative standard deviations of output-gap and inflation rate in the two monetary policy
scenarios minus one. If it is smaller than zero, a country can reduce output and/ or inflation
variability by joining the monetary union. If it is larger than zero, output and/ or inflation
variability increase in case of an accession. Together with other indicators like the Maas-
tricht Criteria or estimates of trade expansion, for example, the indicator can be used in the
assessment of advantages and disadvantages of joining a monetary union.
The effects of a monetary union on domestic output and inflation variability within an open
economy model have also been studied by Kollmann (2004), Pappa (2004) and Røisland
and Torvik (2003), for example. Kollmann (2004) shows that the welfare gain from joining
a monetary union is positively linked to the degree of openness. Pappa (2004) analyzes the
implications of monetary policy coordination and puts the focus on the question whether
the ECB and the Federal Reserve System should cooperate. Røisland and Torvik (2003)
derive analytic results in a non-dynamic framework. The contribution of this paper is an
analysis of monetary policy performance in a small two-country model, which is based on
the open-economy model of McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001) (MN model, henceforth).
While the foreign economy is represented by exogenous univariate stochastic processes in
the original MN model, the two-country version in this paper exhibits a fully specified for-
eign economy with endogenous monetary policy. In this framework, the impact of various
structural parameters on the relative performance of a monetary union is analyzed. The MN
model is chosen because this model exhibits the empirically supported feature of incomplete
exchange-rate pass-through. Additionally, we compare the results of the MN framework to
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corresponding results, which are obtained if the real international linkages are modelled like
in the framework of Galı´ and Monacelli (2005).
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the macroeconomic model is presented and
the performance of national monetary policy is discussed. In section 3, the effects of joining
a monetary union are analyzed for broad ranges of the most important structural parameters.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 A Two-country Model for Monetary Policy Analysis
2.1 General Remarks
In recent years, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have become the
standard framework for the analysis of monetary policy in the short and medium term. In
New-Keynesian DSGE models, monetary policy has real effects because of price rigidities.
The main ingredients of usual New-Keynesian models are households that maximize an
intertemporal utility function, which depends on consumption and leisure, and firms that
maximize profits by setting optimal prices on a monopolistic competitive market. Firms
are not able to adjust prices in each period such that price setting is forward-looking in
the sense that expectations about future demand and marginal costs are already reflected
by today’s goods prices. The literature on New-Keynesian models for monetary policy is
very extensive and cannot be summarized here, overviews can be found in Clarida et al.
(1999), Galı´ (2002), Walsh (2003) or Woodford (2003), for example. This framework has
also been extended to the open economy, see inter alia Clarida et al. (2001, 2002), Galı´ and
Monacelli (2005) as well as McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001). McCallum and Nelson
(MN henceforth) claim that their approach has a “clean and simple theoretical structure”
and is “superior empirically” to other approaches. The main difference to alternative mod-
els is that imported goods are treated as input factors for domestic production and not as
consumption goods. MN compute empirical correlations of the inflation rate and lagged as
well as contemporaneous changes in the nominal exchange rate for 11 industrial countries
and compare these correlations to the corresponding values obtained from simulations. The
contemporaneous correlations for quarterly data vary between −0.1 and 0.3. MN’s theo-
retical baseline scenario implies a contemporaneous correlation of 0.2 while a comparable
version of the Galı´ and Monacelli (2005) model (GM model) yields a contemporaneous
correlation of 0.83. Figure 1 shows cross correlations of nominal exchange rate changes
and consumer price inflation in selected EU member countries which have not adopted the
Euro (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom).
[Figure 1 about here.]
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There is no evidence for immediate or complete pass-through of exchange rate changes
to consumer price inflation in these countries. However, there is some week evidence for
partial pass-through after 2-3 quarters.1 The transmission of exchange rate changes to do-
mestic variables like the inflation rate is an important factor in the comparison of the two
monetary policy scenarios: the extent to which nominal exchange rate changes can help to
compensate asymmetric shocks depends on the pass-through to domestic prices, see also
de Haan et al. (2005, p. 183 ff.). Here, we focus on the MN framework because it implies a
correlation between nominal exchange rate changes and the inflation rate that is closer to the
observed correlations for the accession countries. However, we do also report comparative
results for the GM framework.
Under a few restrictions, which are broadly accepted for short-run analysis of monetary pol-
icy, the dynamics of output-gap and inflation rate can be expressed by a system of linear dif-
ference equations, which is called “canonical representation” by Galı´ and Monacelli (2005)
or “optimizing IS-LM model” by McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001). The system consists
at least of a linearized first-order condition for consumption (“New IS-equation”), a price-
setting equation (“New-Keynesian Phillips curve”), and a monetary policy rule (“Taylor-
rule”). We extend the MN model in the sense that we consider two economies which are
both characterized by such a set of equations and which are connected via the exchange
rate and international trade in goods and financial assets. In the next section, the model is
described in more detail.
2.2 Output and Inflation Dynamics
The basic structure of the MN model is explained in McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2001),
and the GM framework is presented in Galı´ and Monacelli (2005). The following expo-
sition does only report the equilibrium conditions and definitions which are necessary to
characterize the dynamic behavior of output (gap) and inflation rate. In both frameworks,
the household’s log-linearized first order condition relates logarithmic consumption today
(ct) to expected future consumption and the real interest rate:
ct = Etct+1 − 1
σ
(Rt − Etpit+1)− 1
σ
(xd,t+1 − xd,t), σ ≤ 1, (1)
where Et is the expectation operator, Rt is the one-period nominal interest rate, pict =
lnP ct −lnP ct−1 = pct−pct−1 is the consumer price inflation rate and σ is the inverse elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. xdt denotes a demand (preference) shock and follows an
exogenous and stationary AR(1) process. The consumption Euler equation (1) has the same
structure in both home and foreign country. In the following, home and foreign variables
or coefficients are marked by adding a superscript H or F , respectively, and the Euro area
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is defined to be the foreign country while the respective accession country is the home or
domestic country.
We abstract from government expenditure and investment such that the log-linearized re-
source constraint of the economy is
yt = g1ct + g2ext − g3imt, (2)
where yt, ext, imt denote logarithms of output, exports and imports. The weights (g1, g2,
g3) are steady state shares in output of the respective component. In the MN framework,
imported goods are only used as input factors for domestic production (g3 = 0), while
foreign goods are directly consumed by domestic households in the GM framework. The
new EU members are relatively small compared to the Euro area as a whole. The sum of
2005 GDP of all acceding countries is about 8% of euro area GDP. Poland, which is the
largest acceding country, exhibits a share of about 3% in Euro area GDP.2 Therefore, the
share of imports and exports between the euro area and a single acceding country in Euro
area GDP is set equal to zero, that is gF2 = gF3 = 0.
The MN production function is of the CES type, and material imports and labor are the
two input factors. Accordingly, the demand for imported goods can be characterized as
follows:3
imHt = y
H
t −
1
1− νH · qt, (3)
where 1/(1− νH) is the elasticity of substitution between labor and imported materials. qt
is the logarithmic real exchange rate:
qt = st + pcFt − pcHt . (4)
st is the logarithmic nominal exchange rate in terms of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency. Correspondingly, the foreign demand for domestic exports is
exHt = im
F
t = y
F
t +
1
1− νF · qt. (5)
The flexible price output y can be derived from a log-linear approximation to the production
function and is given by
yHt = x
H
at − ωHqt, ωH =
δH
(1− νH)(1− δH) , δ
H = gH3 ν
H , (6)
where xat represents an exogenous productivity shock.
In the GM framework, both foreign products consumed in the home country and domestic
products consumed in the foreign country depend on the terms of trade (ttt) such that GDP
in the home country does also depend on the terms of trade:
yHt = ct +
αω
σ
ttt, ω = σγ + (1− α)(ση − 1), (7)
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where
ttt = st + p
yF
t − pyHt (8)
with pyF and pyHt denoting the price level of goods produced in the Home and the Foreign
country, respectively. α is the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods, η
represents the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, and γ the substitutabil-
ity between goods produced in different foreign countries. The flexible price output depends
on domestic productivity and foreign output and is given by
yHt = Γxa,t + αΨy
F
t , Γ > 0, (9)
Γ and Ψ are functions of the structural parameters.
Firms calculate optimal prices for their products from expected average future inflation and
expected future real marginal costs. Assuming that real marginal costs are proportional to
the output-gap
y˜Ht = y
H
t − yHt , (10)
the inflation rate depends on output-gap and expected inflation. We adopt the hybrid Phillips
curve (NKPC) specification from Galı´ et al. (2001) who provide microfoundations and Euro
area estimates of the Phillips curve:
piyHt = γ
H
b pi
yH
t−1 + (1− γHb ) · βEtpiyHt+1 + κH y˜Ht + xHpit, 0 ≤ γHf < 1, κH > 0, (11)
where piyHt is the inflation rate of goods that are produced in the home country and xHpi is
a cost push shock. In the MN framework CPI inflation (picHt ) is equal to this inflation rate
(picHt = piyHt ), but in the GM framework CPI inflation does also depend on the change in
the terms of trade:
picHt = pi
yH
t + α∆ttt.
2.3 Monetary Policy and Nominal Exchange Rate
Case (i): Two national monetary policies. In case of two national monetary policies,
the acceding country’s central bank and the foreign central bank set nominal interest rates
following national interest rate rules. The foreign central bank follows a Taylor (1993) rule
augmented with interest rate smoothing and a monetary policy shock xFRt:
RFt = τ
F
RR
F
t−1 + (1− τFR ) ·
[
τFy y˜
F
t + τ
F
pi (pi
yF
t − pi∗)
]
+ xFRt, (12)
0 ≤ τR < 1, τy ≥ 0, τpi > 1.
The desired inflation rate pi∗ is assumed to be constant and can therefore be neglected in the
dynamic simulations. Taylor (1999) offers a broad overview of different monetary policy
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rules and their implications. τpi > 1 guarantees that monetary policy has actually a stabiliz-
ing effect on the inflation rate (“Taylor principle”). Since the foreign country is a relatively
closed economy in the sense that foreign output and inflation dynamics do not depend on
economic shocks in the home country, monetary policy performance cannot be increased
by reacting to the exchange rate or foreign variables. However, the monetary policy of the
home country, which is open in the sense that output and inflation dynamics depend on for-
eign economic shocks, may improve its performance by reacting to foreign variables or the
exchange rate. Therefore, we specify a very general interest rate rule for the home country:
RHt = τ
H
F
(
RFt + τ
H
s xst
)
+(1− τHF )
(
τHR R
H
t−1 + (1− τHR )
(
τHy y˜
H + τHpi pi
yH
t + τ
H
q ∆qt
))
+xHRt. (13)
Special cases of the interest rate rule (13) are a domestic inflation Taylor rule (τHF = τHs =
τHR = τ
H
q = 0), a CPI inflation Taylor rule (τHF = τHs = τHR = 0, τHq > 0) and an
exchange rate peg (τHF = τHs = 1, τHR = τHy = τHpi = τHq = 0), for example. In the GM
framework, the change in the real exchange rate (∆qt) has to be replaced by the change in
the terms of trade (∆ttt) in the interest rate rule of the home country. The model is closed
with uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). Based on arbitrage considerations UIP states that
the interest rate differential between two countries has to be equal to the expected change in
the exchange rate:
Etst+1 − st = (RHt − xst)−RFt , (14)
where xst denotes a UIP shock.4
Case (ii): Monetary union. In the monetary union, the single monetary policy is assumed
to be conducted according to the following interest rate rule:
RFt = τ
F
RR
F
t−1 + (1− τFR )
(
τFy
(
wy˜Ht + (1− w)y˜Ft
)
+ τFpi
(
wpiyHt + (1− w)piyFt
))
+ xFRt, (15)
where w is the weight (the share in area wide GDP) of the acceding country. In this case,
national monetary policy and nominal exchange rate do not exist. However, we allow the
home interest rate RHt to deviate transitorily from the area wide interest rate RFt :
RHt = R
F
t + xst. (16)
This expression follows from equation (14) if the expected change in the exchange rate is
zero. However, it is assumed in the following simulations that the variability of the risk
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premium shock xst can be reduced substantially in the monetary union. The real exchange
rate is now given by:
qt = pcFt − pcHt . (17)
2.4 Calibration and Solution of the Model
In both cases (i) and (ii), the MN and the GM model can be written as a system of linear
difference equations which can be solved numerically for the recursive law of motion of all
relevant variables.5 The baseline model is calibrated as follows, see tables 1 and 2, where
also the parameters originally used by MN and GM (MN org, GM org) are reported.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
The discount factor is β = 0.99, which corresponds to a steady state real annual return of
about 4%. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, that is, the inverse elasticity of substitu-
tion, is σ = 5, which corresponds to an interest rate elasticity of consumption of−0.2. This
is compatible with the corresponding value that has been estimated by Smets and Wouters
(2003) (SW) for the Euro area. While labor supply is inelastic in the MN model, we use a
labor supply elasticity of 1/ϕ = 1/3 for the GM model. Following MN, the elasticity of
substitution between labor and material is calibrated such that no excess variability in the
flexible price output is generated: νH = −6 and νF = −2. Export and import shares are
set to 0.3, respectively. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of domestic goods is
² = 6 which implies a steady state markup of µ = 1.2. In the GM framework, the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (η) and the elasticity of substitution
between goods that are produced in different foreign countries (γ) are both equal to one.
Following Galı´ et al. (2001) (GGL), the fraction of backward looking firms is γb = 0.3; and
κ is equal to 0.1 in the MN framework, while κ is a function of other structural parameters
in the GM model. The Euro area monetary policy rule is specified such that it corresponds
approximately to the estimated interest rate rule in Smets and Wouters (2003): τFR = 0.96,
τFy = 0.25, τ
F
pi = 1.82. The baseline specification for the home country interest rate rule
uses τy = 0.5, τpi = 1.5 and τq = 0.1 (other coefficients equal zero). This specification is
discussed in section 2.5. All nine exogenous shocks are stationary autoregressive processes
or order one. The AR coefficients and innovation standard deviations are given in table
2. Foreign productivity, demand and interest rate shocks are specified like in Smets and
Wouters (2003), the cost-push shock and UIP shock parameterizations are more or less ar-
bitrary but not unrealistic. Home shocks have the same AR coefficients like foreign shocks
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but higher standard deviations given that the Euro area shocks are averages of the national
shocks in current member countries.
The solution of the model has the form of a recursive law of motion that describes the
time path of the variables. From the recursive law of motion, the impulse responses to
exogenous shocks and standard deviations of the endogenous variables can be computed.
The model has standard properties in the sense that demand shocks temporarily increase
inflation and output-gap, cost push shocks increase inflation and decrease output-gap, and
restrictive monetary policy shocks are followed by temporary decreases in output-gap and
inflation rate. However, the exact shape of the impulse responses depends on the domestic
monetary policy rule, which we discuss in the next section.
2.5 Performance of National Monetary Policy in the Home Country
We now solve and simulate the calibrated model for different national monetary policy rules
in the home country. The considered interest rate rules are summarized in table 3.6
[Table 3 about here.]
The first rule, which is called strict inflation targeting (SIT) is an interest rate rule with only
inflation as argument. The next four rules are flexible inflation targeting rules (FIT I to IV),
which include also other arguments. FIT I and II include inflation rate and output-gap; FIT
I is the standard Taylor rule, and FIT II has a larger output-gap coefficient. FIT III implies
an interest rate response to changes in the real exchange rate; and FIT IV assumes that the
home central bank follows partially foreign interest rate policy. Both, FIT III and IV aim
at smoothing the exchange rate. PEG is a fixed exchange rate regime, in which the home
interest rate is set such that it corresponds to foreign interest rate plus UIP shock, which can
be interpreted as time-varying risk premium. Finally, MU is the monetary union scenario, in
which the home central bank follows the case (ii) monetary policy rule that has been defined
in equation (15). For the current exercise, we assume, that the UIP shock is completely
eliminated in the MU scenario. The performance of monetary policy is measured in terms of
output-gap and inflation variability. This is the standard measure in the related literature, see
for example Taylor (1999).7 The standard deviations of output-gap, CPI inflation, nominal
interest rate, change in log nominal exchange rate and change in log real exchange rate that
follow from the simulation of the baseline model using the six described monetary policy
rules are reported in table 4.
[Table 4 about here.]
The largest differences in the standard deviations occur for the exchange rate. Both real and
nominal exchange rate changes exhibit large variability in case of SIT, FIT I and FIT II,
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medium variability in case of FIT III and FIT IV, and no variability in case of PEG and MU.
The output-gap standard deviation is minimized by the aggressive Taylor rule FIT II. The
variability of the CPI inflation rate is minimal in case of the PEG and MU regimes. Overall,
there is no monetary policy rule in any of the two frameworks that dominates all others in
the sense of smaller standard deviations of output-gap and inflation rate than all other rules,
see also figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In the following section, we use the interest rate rule FIT III as the national benchmark for
the analysis of the effects of joining a monetary union. FIT III is the best reference rule
because it reflects the fact that small open economies like the possible accession countries
do often react to a certain extent to foreign economic shocks.8 This is also the case for FIT
IV, but table 4 and figure 2 show that FIT III clearly dominates FIT IV with respect to output-
gap and inflation rate variability. We have also analyzed whether output-gap and inflation
rate variability can be further reduced by varying the reaction coefficients (τy, τpi, τq) in FIT
III. While a more aggressive reaction to the output-gap leads to a further reduction in the
variability of the output-gap (MN and GM) and also of the inflation rate (GM), a variation
of the reaction to the real exchange rate does not reduce output-gap and inflation variability.
3 Effects of Joining the Monetary Union
3.1 Impulse Response Analysis
It can already be seen in table 4 and figure 2 that the standard deviation of the home CPI
inflation rate can be substantially reduced by joining a monetary union with the large foreign
country, while the variability of the output-gap increases at the same time. In order to
investigate the rationale for this finding, we now discuss impulse responses of selected
variables to foreign and domestic economic shocks. Due to the relative smallness of the
home country, foreign output-gap and inflation rate react only to foreign shocks. Foreign
demand shocks increase foreign output-gap and inflation rate, foreign cost-push shocks
decrease the foreign output-gap and increase the foreign inflation rate, and transitory foreign
productivity shocks have the same implications like foreign demand shocks with opposite
sign.
The response of home macroeconomic variables to economic shocks depends on the mon-
etary policy rule of the home country. We first look at the responses to a UIP shock, which
can be interpreted as a country-specific risk premium shock that depreciates the domes-
tic currency. Figure 3 shows that output-gap and inflation rate increase in response to the
depreciation in the MN framework.
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[Figure 3 about here.]
The depreciation reduces domestic potential output and increases the demand for domestic
exports such that the output-gap increases. This leads in turn to higher inflation. In the
GM framework, output-gap and CPI inflation do also increase. The depreciation increases
the demand for domestic exports and makes consumption goods that are produced in the
foreign country more expensive, see figure 4.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The UIP shock in a narrow sense disappears in a monetary union. However, there still may
be an interest rate differential, which is represented by xst, but now with lower variability
than in the national monetary policy scenario. This is one reason, why the monetary union
regime might yield lower inflation rate and output-gap standard deviations than the national
monetary policy rules. The baseline scenario finding of table 4 that the standard deviation
of the output-gap is larger and that the standard deviation of the inflation rate is lower in a
monetary union than for the benchmark rule FIT III can be illustrated quite well for foreign
demand shocks. A foreign demand shock increases the demand for domestic export goods
and depreciates the domestic currency, which leads to domestic inflation. However, in case
of a monetary union the real depreciation is not as strong as in case of FIT III, such that
the increase in inflation is smaller. On the other hand, the output-gap is substantially larger,
partially also because the single monetary policy rule is not as aggressive with respect to the
output-gap as the domestic monetary policy rule FIT III. Since these results are quite similar
for both MN and GM framework, we do only show the corresponding impulse responses
for the MN framework in figure 5.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The MN and GM frameworks do also have the common implication that the national mon-
etary policy leads to lower standard deviations of output-gap and inflation rate than the
monetary union if only foreign cost push shocks are present.
3.2 The Relative Loss-Index and its Determinants
The relative standard deviations of domestic output-gap and inflation rate,
Ly =
L
(ii)
y
L
(i)
y
− 1 = σ
(ii)
y˜
σ
(i)
y˜
− 1, Lpi = L
(ii)
pi
L
(i)
pi
− 1 = σ
(ii)
pi
σ
(i)
pi
− 1, (18)
are interpreted as measures of the relative performance of monetary policy. σ(i)y˜ and σ
(i)
pi
denote standard deviations of domestic output-gap and consumer price inflation rate in case
11
of two national monetary policies. σ(ii)y˜ and σ
(ii)
pi denote standard deviations of domestic
output-gap and consumer price inflation rate in case of a monetary union. The relative loss
in the monetary union can be summarized in a weighted average of Ly and Lpi:
RLI = ζLy + (1− ζ)Lpi. (19)
The relative loss index (RLI) reveals whether it is advantageous for an acceding country to
join the monetary union (RLI < 0) or not (RLI > 0). We will now discuss the impact of
selected structural parameters on the relative standard deviations of output-gap and inflation
rate and on the relative loss index for ζ = 0.5.
Relative risk aversion (elasticity of intertemporal substitution). If all other parameters
are fixed at their baseline values, the relative loss index decreases in the relative risk aversion
(σ, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution), see figure 6 (c). That is,
the less consumption reacts to interest rate changes, the lower are the costs of joining the
monetary union in terms of output and inflation variability. This effect is driven by the
corresponding effect on the standard deviation of the output-gap, see figure 6 (a), while the
relative variability of the inflation rate is more or less invariant to variations in the coefficient
of relative risk aversion if all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values, see figure 6
(b). The effect on RLI is not invariant to changes in the baseline parameters. If the degree
of price flexibility (κ) increases, the relationship becomes unstable.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Compatible to the findings of Pappa (2004, p. 769 f.), in the GM framework the relative loss
is strictly decreasing in the coefficient of relative risk aversion.9
Degree of price flexibility. The relative loss index RLI is increasing in the degree of
price flexibility (κ) if all other parameters are fixed at their baseline values, see figures 6
(a)-(c). In particular the relative standard deviation of the inflation rate increases in κ.
Openness. In the MN framework, the degree of openness is reflected by the export share.
Keeping all other parameters at their baseline values, the relative standard deviation of the
output-gap and the RLI are decreasing in the degree of openness, see figure 7. The relative
standard deviation of the inflation rate is only slightly affected by variations in the degree of
openness (notice the scaling in figure 7 (b)). That is, a single monetary policy becomes more
attractive when a larger share of domestically produced goods is exported to the foreign
country. This is also found in the GM framework, where the degree of openness is reflected
by the import share (α).
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[Figure 7 about here.]
Export demand elasticity. The export demand elasticity describes the percentage change
in domestic exports in response to a one percent change in the real exchange rate. In the MN
framework, this elasticity depends on the substitutability of labor and imported materials in
the foreign production function and is given by 1/(1 − νF ), see equation 5. The larger
νF (the smaller in absolute value), the larger is the export demand elasticity. While the
relative standard deviation of the output-gap is decreasing in the export demand elasticity,
the relative standard deviation of the inflation rate is only affected to a small extend by it, see
figure 7. In the GM framework, the parameter η governs the export demand elasticity. The
larger the export demand elasticity, the lower are the costs of joining the monetary union in
terms of output and inflation variability, which is again compatible to the findings of Pappa
(2004, p. 769 f.).
Shocks. The RLI is also determined by the properties of the stochastic shocks that drive
the dynamics. We consider productivity shocks first. If foreign and home productivity
shocks are uncorrelated and if their standard deviations correspond to the baseline values,
then the standard deviation of the output-gap increases (Ly > 0) and that of the inflation
rate decreases (Lpi < 0) by joining the monetary union. This has already been discussed in
section 3. If the standard deviations of uncorrelated home and foreign productivity shocks
become larger, then the relative standard deviations increase and the monetary union be-
comes even less attractive. While the relative standard deviation of the output gap is more
or less invariant to changes in the correlation of home and foreign productivity shocks, the
relative standard deviation of the inflation rate decreases in the correlation, see figure 8. (In
the figure, the respective baseline values of the two standard deviations are scaled by the
factor represented by the ’xa S.D.‘ axis.)
[Figure 8 about here.]
In the GM framework, the relative standard deviation of the output-gap behaves more or
less like in the MN framework, but the relative standard deviation of the inflation rate is
increasing in the correlation of foreign and home productivity shocks. The effects of cost-
push shock properties on the RLI are depicted in figure 9. The RLI is strictly decreasing
in the correlation of foreign and home cost-push shocks.
[Figure 9 about here.]
In the GM framework, standard deviation and correlation of cost-push shocks exhibit pos-
itive impact on the relative standard deviation of the inflation rate, and negative impact on
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the relative standard deviation of the output gap. The standard deviation and the correlation
of demand shocks have only a very small impact on RLI in both frameworks.
3.3 Comparison of MN and GM and Discussion
The effects of parameter variations on the relative standard deviations in both frameworks
are summarized in table 5.
[Table 5 about here.]
In most cases, the effects have the same sign or the effect is rather small in one of the
frameworks. So one can state that the corresponding effects are not contrary in the two
frameworks. However, this statement does not hold true for the effect of the properties of
the cost-push shock on inflation. While the relative standard deviation of the inflation rate
decreases in standard deviation and correlation of the cost-push shock in the MN framework,
the opposite effect occurs in the GM framework.
There exist parameter constellations in both frameworks, for which the relative standard
deviation of the inflation rate can be decreased by joining the monetary union (Lpi < 0). The
standard deviation of the output-gap, however, does increase for all realistic specifications of
the considered structural parameters (Ly > 0), but the increase is smaller if the relative risk
aversion is large, if the respective country is relatively open in terms of the export share, or if
cost-push shocks are positively correlated. The assessment of the overall effect on output-
gap and inflation variability does therefore depend on the corresponding preferences (ζ).
Additionally, joining the monetary union will reduce the standard deviation of risk premium
(UIP) shocks substantially since no exchange rate changes are expected to occur in the
future. Taking this effect into account would move all the surfaces that we have considered
downwards and would eventually lead to an RLI that is smaller than 0. Furthermore, it
should be kept in mind that our analysis puts its focus on the costs of joining the monetary
union in terms of output and inflation variability. In the decision process if or when to
join EMU, the various benefits of a monetary union, for instance lower transaction costs or
imported credibility, have to be considered, too.
4 Conclusions
We have used two different frameworks (MN and GM) for small open economies to investi-
gate the effect of joining a monetary union on output and inflation variability in a small ac-
cession country. The models are calibrated such that they roughly reflect the situation of the
new EU member countries which are expected to join the European Monetary Union within
the next years. In the McCallum-Nelson (MN) framework, imported goods are not directly
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consumed like in the Galı´-Monacelli (GM) framework such that consumer price inflation
is not as strongly influenced by nominal exchange rate changes as in the GM framework.
This is motivated by the empirical finding that pass-through from nominal exchange-rates
to consumer prices is rather low – at least in the short run. Two main results can be reported.
The first main result is related to the traditional argument in the literature on the costs and
benefits of a monetary union that the renunciation of national monetary policy may lead to
larger variability in output-gap and inflation rate. In a monetary union, monetary policy is
not tailor-made for any of the member countries, especially not for small member countries.
Therefore, monetary policy in a monetary union does not explicitly stabilize output-gap and
inflation rate in case of national economic shocks. We have shown how the effect of join-
ing the monetary union on domestic output-gap and inflation rate variability depends on
structural parameters like relative risk aversion, price flexibility, export demand elasticity,
openness and shock correlations. For this task, standard deviations of output-gap and infla-
tion rate in a monetary union are compared to the corresponding standard deviations in a
reference scenario with a flexible open-economy interest rate rule. In our baseline scenario
and for a broad range of parameter specifications, joining the monetary union increases the
variability of the output-gap, but decreases the variability of the inflation rate. However, if
there are quite volatile country-specific UIP shocks (risk premium shocks), which increase
the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate and which can be reduced or even be
eliminated by joining the monetary union, then the variability of output-gap and inflation
rate can be reduced by joining the monetary union. The second main result is related to
the usage of particular models like the MN or GM framework for the derivation of policy
implications in practice. It turns out that both frameworks yield quite similar results, but
that the effects of variations of the cost-push shock properties on the relative variability of
the inflation rate are contrary in both frameworks.
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Notes
1The graphical analysis of these correlations is, of course, not sufficient to support this statement. A more
detailed analysis is provided by Hoffmann and Holtemo¨ller (2007).
2Own calculations from Eurostat data. Euro area GDP is the sum of the GDP in Euro in 2005 of all thirteen
current members of the EMU. Accession countries are all non-EMU EU members with exception of United
Kingdom and Denmark.
3In all behavioral equations we neglect constant terms because they have no influence on the dynamic
simulations.
4Kollmann (2004, p. 294) argues that shocks in the UIP equation reflect a bias in the date t forecast for the
exchange rate in t+ 1. Alternatively, the UIP shock can be interpreted as a country-specific risk premium.
5The MatLab toolkit provided by Uhlig (1999) has been used for this task.
6Interest rate smoothing in the home country is not considered here because the effect on output-gap and
inflation rate variability is very small in the current MN and GM frameworks. However, interest rate smoothing
can increase welfare in models with habit persistence in consumption, see Choi and Jung (2003).
7Using a fully specified optimizing model would allow to assess performance in terms of the utility function
of the representative household. This approach is proposed by Woodford (2003), for example.
8Moreover, Wollmersha¨user (2006) shows that a monetary policy rule that reacts to the real exchange rate
dominates closed economy interest rate rules if exchange rate uncertainty occurs.
9We do not report detailed figures for the GM framework in order to save space. An appendix that contains
these figures is available upon request.
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Figure 1: Cross Correlations of Nominal Exchange Rate Changes and Consumer Price
Inflation Rates in Selected Countries
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Notes: The graphs show correlations of the CPI inflation rate at time t and the change in the log nominal
exchange rate at time t + j. The horizontal axis represents the index j. Quarterly data from 1999:1 to 2006:2
has been used. The CPI inflation rate has been seasonally adjusted by regressing it on seasonal dummies and
AR-terms and subtracting the deterministic seasonal pattern. Dotted lines are ±2 standard errors.
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Figure 2: Monetary Policy Rules Ranked by Standard Deviations in MN and GM Frame-
works
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Notes: For all seven monetary policy scenarios, the respective variables have been ordered with respect to their
standard deviations. The figures show the corresponding ranks, where 1 denotes the smallest standard deviation
and 7 the largest one. ygap denotes the output-gap, pic consumer price inflation, R nominal interest rate, ds
nominal exchange rate growth rate, dq real exchange rate growth rate, dtt growth rate of terms of trade, and piy
inflation rate of domestic goods. The monetary policy scenarios are specified in table 3.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses of Domestic Variables to UIP Shock (MN)
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Domestic Variables to UIP Shock (GM)
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Domestic Variables to Foreign Demand Shock (MN)
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Figure 6: Relative Risk Aversion, Price Flexibility and RLI (MN Framework)
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Notes: The figures show (a) the relative standard deviation of the output gap minus one, Ly , (b) the relative
standard deviation of the inflation rate minus one, Lpi , and (c) the relative loss index, RLI , for different values
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution), σ, and the degree of
price flexibility, κ.
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Figure 7: Openness, Export Demand Elasticity and RLI (MN Framework)
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Notes: The figures show (a) the relative standard deviation of the output gap minus one, Ly , (b) the relative
standard deviation of the inflation rate minus one, Lpi , and (c) the relative loss index, RLI , for different val-
ues of the export share (the degree of openness), g2, and the export demand elasticity, which is a monotone
transformation of ν.
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Figure 8: Productivity Shocks and RLI (MN Framework)
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Notes: The figures show (a) the relative standard deviation of the output gap minus one, Ly , (b) the relative
standard deviation of the inflation rate minus one, Lpi , and (c) the relative loss index, RLI , for different values
of the standard deviation of home and foreign productivity shocks, xa S.D., and the correlation of home and
foreign productivity shocks, xa Corr.
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Figure 9: Cost-push Shocks and RLI (MN Framework)
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Notes: The figures show (a) the relative standard deviation of the output gap minus one, Ly , (b) the relative
standard deviation of the inflation rate minus one, Lpi , and (c) the relative loss index, RLI , for different values
of the standard deviation of home and foreign cost-push shocks, xpi S.D., and the correlation of home and
foreign productivity shocks, xpi Corr.
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Table 3: Home Country Interest Rate Rules
τy τpi τF τq τR τs
SIT Strict Inflation Targeting 0 1.5 0 0 0 0
FIT I Flexible Inflation Targeting I 0.5 1.5 0 0 0 0
FIT II Flexible Inflation Targeting II 1 1.5 0 0 0 0
FIT III Flexible Inflation Targeting III 0.5 1.5 0 1 0 0
FIT IV Flexible Inflation Targeting IV 0.5 1.5 0.5 0 0 0
PEG Peg 0 0 1 0 0 1
MU Monetary Union
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Table 4: Monetary Policy Rule and Standard Deviations of Macroeconomic Variables
Standard Deviations MN Model Standard Deviations GM Model
MP Rule y˜ pic R ∆s ∆q y˜ pic R ∆s ∆tt piy
SIT 1.217 1.416 2.128 4.502 4.588 0.933 1.367 1.470 3.360 3.178 0.978
FIT I 0.935 1.316 1.972 4.668 4.824 0.757 2.506 1.487 8.960 9.432 0.972
FIT II 0.761 1.281 1.894 3.989 3.616 0.635 1.413 1.517 3.139 2.698 0.985
FIT III 0.941 1.280 1.963 3.830 3.492 0.752 1.182 1.482 3.042 3.079 0.969
FIT IV 1.406 1.474 1.315 3.589 3.512 0.897 1.644 1.363 3.125 2.849 1.438
PEG 1.709 1.127 2.075 0.000 1.225 1.064 0.797 2.072 0.000 1.007 1.008
MU 1.664 1.125 0.197 0.000 1.223 0.971 0.781 0.135 0.000 0.983 0.983
Notes: The table shows standard deviations of selected variables for different monetary policy scenarios. The
monetary policy scenarios are explained in table 3. The standard deviations are computed using 1000 replica-
tions of simulated time series of length 1000.
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Table 5: Effects of Parameter Variations on Relative Standard Deviations
Parameter Effect on Ly Effect on Lpi Effect on RLI
MN, GM MN GM MN GM MN GM
σ – – – 0 – –
κ, ϕ + 0 + 0 + 0
g2, α (–) – ∼ – (–) –
ν, η – – ∼ ∼ – –
xa S.D. + + (+) + + +
xa Corr. 0 0 (–) ∼ 0 0
xpi S.D. – – – + – –
xpi Corr. – – – + – (–)
Notes: – indicates a negative partial effect, + a positive partial effect, 0 no effect. Parentheses indicate that the
strongness of the effect depends on the value(s) of other parameter(s). ∼ symbolizes that there is no clear and
unambiguous effect of the parameter on the respective relative standard deviation.
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